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Abstract: Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) provide many significant advantages to the contemporary business 
enterprise. WLANs also provide considerable security challenges for network administrators and users. Data 
confidentiality (ie, unauthorised access to data) breaches are the major security vulnerability within WLANs. To date, the 
major IT security standards from the International Standards Organisation (the ISO/IEC 17799) and the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (the NIST Special Publication or ‘SP’ suite) have only a superficial coverage of WLAN 
security controls and compliance certification strategies. The clear responsibility for WLAN managers is to provide 
network users with best practice security strategies to mitigate the real risk of unauthorised data access. The clear 
responsibility for IT auditors is to ensure that best practice security practices are in place and that operational compliance 
is consistently achieved. This paper describes a newly researched software auditing artefact for the evaluation of the 
data confidentiality levels of WLAN transmissions – and therefore by extension for the evaluation of existing security 
controls to mitigate the risk of WLAN confidentiality breaches. The paper describes how the software auditing artefact 
has been evolved via a design science research methodology, and pivots upon the real time passive sampling of data 
packets as they are transmitted between mobile users and mobile transmission access points. The paper describes how 
the software auditing artefact uses these sampled data packets to produce a very detailed evaluation of the levels of data 
confidentiality in effect across the WLAN. This detailed evaluation includes specific identification (for network managers) 
of the types of software services operating across the WLAN that are not supported with the appropriate data 
confidentiality controls. The paper concludes by presenting an analysis of the results achieved during beta testing of the 
auditing artefact within a university production WLAN environment, together with a brief description of WLAN best 
practice security.  
 
Keywords: Security, WLAN, confidentiality, auditing, 802.11. 
 
1. Introduction 
The use of computing and telecommunication 
technologies has revolutionised the design of 
business practices over the past two decades. 
Amongst these computing and telecommunication 
technologies wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) are increasingly providing significant 
advantages to the contemporary enterprise. The 
WLAN concept allows any data entry/retrieval 
device to be moved to any location within a mobile 
cell (defined as that geographical area in which 
the strength of the mobile signal ensures its easy 
recognition and consistent integrity). WLANs 
facilitate ready deployment, simplification of office 
infrastructure requirements, and adoption of 
mobile and nomadic work patterns. WLANs 
enable roaming employees to have access to 
applications and information on demand. WLANs 
also directly encourage the design of more 
streamlined business processes. The sales 
function can unfold at any location throughout the 
store via wireless connections between multiple 
point-of-sales machines linking with centralised 
order-processing servers (Dennis 2002).  The 
sales function is also evolving via wireless 
networks to focus on the nomadic customer 
(Sabat 2002). The stocktaking function becomes 
more efficient when the relevant personnel are 
mobilised within warehouses and supermarkets 
and operate bar-coding devices to update 
centralised inventory lists via wireless 
connections. Many more examples of such 
efficiencies provided by WLANs are outlined in 
(Sabat 2002). All of these business process 
redesigns allow a more flexible customer-staff 
relationship and provide the basis for the rapidly 
emerging business paradigm of M-Commerce, 
defined as “any transaction with a monetary value 
either direct or indirect that is conducted over a 
wireless telecommunications network” (Sabat 
2002). The business drivers outlined above have 
caused WLANs to become more pervasive 
(Tsalgatidou 2001). The Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA) has stated 
that the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) 
is widespread and is likely to increase. Garner 
Dataquest has recorded that worldwide PDA 
shipments were 11.4 billion units in 2004. These 
demand trends in turn have caused the cost of 
WLAN adoption to drop by significant margins. 
Indeed costs have reached such a level where 
many Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are 
incorporating WLANs into their business 
strategies.  
 
Confidentiality is an essential network security 
quality of service parameter. Confidentiality is 
defined in ISO/IEC 27001 as “the property that 
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information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes.” 
ISO/IEC 27001 and (Garfinkel 2002) state that 
confidentiality must be assured (where relevant) 
for all network transmissions. WLANs pose a 
confidentiality vulnerability not usually 
encountered with guided (ie, wired) networks. This 
vulnerability occurs because wireless signal 
spread is physically dictated by the cell concept 
and not necessarily by the architectural design of 
business accommodation or the availability of 
wired access points. Consequently a wireless 
signal can ‘leak’ past the physical perimeter of a 
business enterprise and into public airway space. 
This same signal leakage may also occur within 
the sizable public contact areas provided by many 
businesses within their infrastructure perimeter. 
This scenario offers significant opportunity for the 
unauthorised and non-detectable introduction of 
wireless devices within the wireless cell space of 
an enterprise. These wireless devices are then 
the launching pad for confidentiality attacks on the 
business network. These attacks, known as “Drive 
by Hacking” are well described in (Hinde 2001).  
 
The motivation for the research described in this 
paper is the design and testing of an innovative 
software auditing artefact that evaluates the data 
confidentiality levels of WLAN transmissions – 
and therefore by extension mitigates the risk of 
WLAN confidentiality breaches. The paper 
describes how the software auditing artefact has 
been prototyped via a design science research 
methodology (Hevner 2004), and operationally 
pivots upon the real time passive sampling of data 
packets as they are transmitted between mobile 
users and mobile transmission access points. The 
software auditing artefact uses these sampled 
data packets to produce a very detailed evaluation 
of the levels of data confidentiality in effect across 
the WLAN. This detailed evaluation includes 
specific identification (for network managers) of 
the types of software services operating across 
the WLAN that are not supported with the 
appropriate data confidentiality controls. This 
paper unfolds in the following format. Section two 
discusses WLAN protocol design and describes 
why this design proves to be problematic in terms 
of data confidentiality. Section three discusses the 
design science research methodology and the 
conceptual design of the software auditing artefact 
produced via the methodology. Section four 
presents an analysis of the results achieved 
during beta testing of the auditing artefact within a 
university production WLAN environment. Section 
five describes best practice security solutions for a 
WLAN environment. Section six concludes the 
paper.  
2. WLAN overview 
The major wireless standards are published by 
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE). IEEE802.11 (WLAN) has 
become more popular than other protocols (eg the 
European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute’s High Performance Radio Local Area 
Network) defined within an overall WLAN context 
(Frankel 2006). The IEEE 802 wireless suite also 
defines a range of protocols for other wireless 
network topologies. The Wireless Personal Area 
Networks (WPAN) topology describes small-scale 
wireless networks that require little or no 
infrastructure (Sabat 2002). A WPAN is typically 
used by a few devices in a single room (eg, print 
service, keyboard or mouse connectivity). WPAN 
standards include 802.15.1 (Bluetooth), 802.15.3a 
(Ultrawideband) and 802.15.4 (ZigBee). The 
Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN) 
topology provides connectivity to users located in 
multiple facilities that are generally within a few 
miles of each other. IEEE 802.16 (better known as 
WiMAX) is a WMAN standard. IEEE 802.11 is well 
suited for most intra-office wireless networking 
scenarios and has become dominant within the 
WLAN market (Gast 2005). IEEE 802.11 is the 
WLAN protocol under analysis in this research. 
This section will firstly present an overview of 
802.11, and then analyse the 802.11 security 
focus.   
2.1 IEEE 802.11 overview 
The initial IEEE 802.11 standard (also know as 
Wireless Fidelity or Wi-Fi) was published in 1997. 
That standard has since been updated in 1999 
and 2003. The current standard has been 
accepted by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) and has also been adopted by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO) as ISO/IEC 8802-11:2003. The IEEE 802.11 
standard uses the Media Access Control (MAC) 
protocol Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance. An overview 802.11 
bandwidths, frequency spectrums, and release 
timetables is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of IEEE 802.11 WLAN technologies 
.IEEE Standard  Maximum 
Data Rate 
Typical Range Frequency 
Band 
 
Comments 
802.11 2 Mbps 50-100 metres 2.4 GHz  
802.11a 54 Mbps 50-100 metres 5 GHz Not compatible with 802.11b; 
more expensive to implement 
than 802.11b 
802.11b 11 Mbps 50-100 metres 2.4 GHz Equipment based on 802.11b 
has been the dominant 
technology 
802.11g 54 Mbps 50-100 metres 2.4 or 5 GHz Backward compatible with 
802.11b 
 
Table 1 does not include all current and pending 
802.11 amendments. For example, in November 
2005, IEEE ratified IEEE 802.11e, which provides 
quality of service enhancements to IEEE 802.11 
that improve the delivery of multimedia content. 
The IEEE 802.11n project is also currently 
considering four proposals for IEEE 802.11 
enhancements that will enable data throughput of 
at least 100 Mbps. 
2.2 802.11 security 
The IEEE 802.11 variants listed in Table 1 all 
include a security architecture known as Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP). The fundamental goal 
of WEP was to provide a level of security 
comparable to that of wired LANs. The design of 
WEP assumed the major categories of threats 
facing the WLAN paradigm were identical to those 
posed to guided (ie, wired) LAN networks. 
Consequently the design of WEP focused upon 
providing authentication, confidentiality, and 
integrity controls for all transmissions between a 
wireless user and a WLAN access point. It should 
be noted that the designers of the original 802.11 
standard only ever intended WEP to make it 
difficult to break into a WLAN – the designers did 
not intend WEP to provide military levels of 
access. Section 8.2.2 of the 1999 IEEE 802.11 
standard states the following in relation to 802.11 
WEP design objectives (quoted verbatim): 
 
? It is reasonably strong: The security afforded 
by the algorithm relies on the difficulty of 
discovering the secret key through a brute-
force attack. This in turn is related to the 
length of the secret key and the frequency of 
changing the keys. WEP allows for the 
changing of the key (K) and frequent 
changing of the Initialisation Vector (IV). 
? It is self synchronising: WEP is self-
synchronising for each message. This 
property is critical for a data-link-level 
encryption algorithm, where “best effort” 
delivery is assumed and packet loss rates 
may be high. 
? It is efficient: The WEP algorithm is efficient 
and may be implemented in either hardware 
or software. 
? It may be exportable: Every effort has been 
made to design the WEP system operation so 
as to maximise the chances of approval, by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, of export 
from the U.S. of products containing a WEP 
implementation. However, due to the legal 
and political climate toward cryptography at 
the time of publication, no guarantee can be 
made that any specific IEEE 802.11 
implementations that use WEP will be 
exportable from the USA. 
? It is optional: The implementation and use of 
WEP is an IEEE 802.11 option. 
In retrospect, the designers’ goal of a 
“reasonable” level of security was a mistake (it 
should be noted that the work “reasonable” was 
dropped in the marketing campaign for the initial 
promotion of IEEE 802.11 – and WEP was simply 
described as “secure”). The contemporary 
security community promotes only two types of 
security: strong security and no security 
(sometimes described as open security). The 
WEP design proved to be inadequate for one 
main reason: the relative ease of intercepting 
WLAN transmissions (and also inserting spoofed 
transmissions into the transmission stream). This 
relative ease of interception is caused by the 
omni-directional transmission propagation of a 
WLAN as contrasted with the constrained/guided 
transmission propagation of a traditional LAN. 
This means that an attacker in a WLAN simply 
needs to be within range of the WLAN 
infrastructure (ie, a wireless sender or receiver), 
whilst in the wired LAN an attacker would need to 
gain physical access to the LAN (ie, physical 
access to a wired connection point). The security 
consequence is clear: a WLAN is more vulnerable 
to confidentiality breaches (eg, eavesdropping) 
than a traditional guided/wired LAN.  
 
WEP uses the well regarded RC4 symmetric 
encryption algorithm to mitigate the confidentiality 
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risk inherent in WLAN transmissions. The WEP 
standard specifies that the symmetric key used 
within WEP-implemented RC4 should include a 
24-bit value known as an initialisation vector (IV). 
It is this value that has caused much of the 
security concern that has since been documented 
about WEP. As early as 2001 (Fluhrer 2001) 
showed via experiment that an eavesdropper 
could deduce the base RC4 key by obtaining a 
relatively small number of packets within a WLAN 
communication session. Shortly after (Stubblefield 
2002) reported that the experimental approach of 
(Fluhrer 2001) had been used to mount a 
successful attack against a production WLAN 
system. Many more successful WEP attacks have 
been since described (Airmagnet 2004). (Cam-
Winget 2003) summarised the security 
community’s assessment of WEP by stating: “The 
security goal of WEP is data confidentiality 
equivalent to that of a wired LAN. WEP falls short 
of this objective…”. The vulnerabilities within WEP 
are further exposed by the emergence of a suite 
of open source WEP-cracking software tools 
(Ossman 2004).   
 
The IEEE response to the WEP vulnerabilities 
was the formation of the 802.11i (Security) group, 
a body charged with the total overhaul of security 
within 802.11. The 802.11i group’s security 
review, however, would prove to be a long term 
project over several years. As an interim security 
measure, a non-profit industry consortium of 
WLAN equipment and software vendors (the Wi-Fi 
Alliance) began work on a more robust WLAN 
security specification in 2002. In October 2002 the 
Wi-Fi Alliance released the first specification of 
the interim WLAN security specification: Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA). WPA proved to be 
much stronger than WEP, but did ultimately 
exhibit some vulnerabilities in the areas of 
authentication and key exchange (Moskowitz 
2003). 
 
In June 2004 the IEEE finalised the 802.11i 
standard – specifying security components that 
work in conjunction with all Table 1 standards. 
The IEEE 802.111i standard includes many 
security enhancements that leverage existing 
mature and proven security protocols. The 802.11i 
standard introduces the concept of a Robust 
Security Network (RSN), which is defined as a 
communication association/session between two 
WLAN entities that fully implement 802.11i. An 
RSN provides verifiably strong security in the 
areas of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
access control. The 802.11i standard takes a two-
track approach to addressing the security 
weaknesses that had existed within WEP. Its 
major components are two new link-layer 
encryption protocols. The first, the Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP) was designed to bolster 
security to the greatest extent possible on pre-
802.11i hardware. The second, Counter Mode 
with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) is a new 
encryption protocol designed from the ground up 
to offer the greatest level of security. The 802.11i 
standard is industry-accepted as strong security 
(Gast 2005). In conjunction with the ratification of 
802.11i, the Wi-Fi Alliance specified WPA2 in 
September 2004 to completely comply with the 
IEEE 802.11 standard as amended by IEEE 
802.11i. Official support for WPA2 in Microsoft 
Windows XP was rolled out on 1st May 2005 
(some driver upgrades for network cards may be 
required). As from March 13, 2006, WPA2 
certification is mandatory for all new devices 
wishing to be Wi-Fi certified. 
3. Research experiment overview 
The motivation for the research experiment 
described in this paper is the design and testing of 
a software auditing artefact that evaluates the 
data confidentiality levels of WLAN transmissions. 
This section will firstly discuss the design science 
framework that has been adopted as the research 
methodology for this experiment. The section will 
then describe the logical design and network 
positioning of the software audit artefact that was 
prototyped during the experiment.  
3.1 Research methodology 
Design science is one of the two paradigms (the 
other being behavioural science) that characterise 
much of the research in the Information Systems 
discipline (Hevner 2004).  In the design science 
paradigm, knowledge and understanding of a 
problem domain and its solution are achieved in 
the building, application, and evaluation of a 
designed artefact. (Hevner 2004) differentiates 
design science from routine design by stating: 
“The difference is in the nature of the problems 
and solutions. Routine design is the application of 
existing knowledge to organisational problems… 
On the other hand, design-science research 
addresses important unsolved problems in unique 
and innovative ways or solved problems in more 
effective or efficient ways. The key differentiator 
between routine design and design research is 
the clear identification of a contribution to the 
archival knowledge base of foundations and 
methodologies.” In addition to the crucial 
differentiation between routine design and design 
research, (Hevner 2004) proposes the following 
heuristics to assist the research community in 
understanding the requirements for effective 
design science research: 
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? Design science research requires the creation 
of a purposeful artefact for a specified 
problem domain.  
? The artefact is represented in a structured 
form that may vary from software, formal 
logic, and rigorous mathematics to informal 
natural language descriptions. 
? The artefact must yield utility for the specified 
problem, and this utility must be evaluated. 
The artefact must be innovative – solving a 
heretofore unsolved problem or solving a 
known problem is a more effective way.  
? The artefact must be rigorously defined, 
formally represented, coherent, and internally 
consistent.   
? The design process should comprise a ‘build-
and-evaluate’ loop that is typically iterated a 
number of times before the final artefact is 
generated. 
? The research results must be communicated 
effectively. 
Design science – and all heuristics outlined above 
– have been used to produce the audit software 
artefact described in the next section.  
3.2 Audit software artefact logical 
design and network positioning 
The audit software artefact produced within this 
research is designed to evaluate the data 
confidentiality levels of WLAN (802.11) 
transmissions. The network positioning of the 
artefact and its logical design is now discussed 
with reference to Figure 1.  
  
 
Wired (Guided) LAN 
Router Internet 
Wireless Access  
Point (AP) 
Wireless Client 
(Laptop)  
Wireless Client 
(Laptop) 
Audit Software 
comprising 
 
1. Analysis Engine 
2. Copy Engine 
WLAN Reception Boundary (typically 50 – 100 
metres) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Audit software tool – Network positioning and logical architecture 
Figure 1 shows a typical WLAN within an overall 
context of a wired (guided) LAN and Internet 
connectivity. The WLAN comprises one or more 
wireless access points (APs) which in turn wire 
back to the wired LAN backbone. The wired LAN 
backbone itself connects to the Internet via one or 
more routers. The WLAN reception boundary 
(from each AP) is within the range 50 – 100 
metres. The only positioning requirement for the 
audit software is that its host (routinely a wireless 
enabled laptop) is within the reception boundary 
of a targeted AP. All mainstream operating 
systems (eg, Windows XP) routinely report WLAN 
signal strength to the nearest AP – this is a ready 
guide to the appropriate positioning of the audit 
tool.  
 
The overall logical design of the audit tool 
comprises a low level Copy Engine and a higher 
level Analysis Engine. The Copy Engine places 
the wireless network card of the host into RFMON 
mode – thereby ensuring the network card 
captures all WLAN packets (i.e. control, 
management, and data packets) as they are 
transmitted between mobile users and mobile 
transmission access point. The Copy Engine is a 
Win32 Open Source port of libpcap – a widely 
used network programming Application 
Programming Interface (API) for 
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capturing/imaging network packets (within 
wireless and wired networks). The Copy Engine 
may be configured to operate on a temporal 
sessional basis (ie, copying packets for a defined 
time period) or on a packet count sessional basis 
(ie, copying packets until a defined count is 
reached). The captured network packets are then 
saved to file storage for subsequent processing by 
the Analysis Engine. The Analysis Engine 
comprises three main categories of software: a 
read module (the input of data from file storage), a 
suite of protocol analysers, and a logger module 
(the output of data to file storage). The heart of 
the Analysis Engine is the suite of protocol 
analysers which process the captured network 
packets (imaged by the Copy Engine) with a logic 
and sequence which is now described with the 
assistance of Figure 2.  
 
Layer 2 
Wireless 
Header 
(802.11) 
Layer 2 
Wired 
Header 
(802.3) 
Layer 3 
Header 
(IP) 
Layer 4 
Header 
(TCP/UDP) 
 
Data Payload 
 
1 WEP 
Protocol 
2 IP 
Protocol 
Sampled Data Packet 
3 TCP/UDP 
Protocol Analyser
4 TCP Protocol 
and Payload 
Figure 2: Packet structure and protocol analysers 
Figure 2 shows the structure of the generic data 
packet which is of most interest to the audit tool of 
this research. The audit tool views each packet as 
a bit stream comprising a series of headers and 
data payload. This structure follows the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model from the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO). The 
802.3 Ethernet header is not always present – it 
only occurs where the wireless transmission forms 
a ‘bridge’ between wired (Ethernet) LANs (the 
audit tool however must allow for this possibility). 
The Analysis Engine uses each protocol analyser 
in two ways: (1) to test certain bit/byte values in 
the appropriate header; and (2) to search for the 
occurrence of certain string (ie, text) values within 
the data payload. A highly abstracted algorithmic 
description of the operation of the Analysis Engine 
and each protocol analyser is as follows: 
 
INITIALISATION: Set all global count variables 
uses in statistically reporting this set of WLAN 
transmissions to 0. The global count variables are 
as follows:  
 
TOTAL:  The total number of packets 
analysed in this sample. 
 
OPEN-HTTP-AUTHENTICATION: Indicates Basic 
Authentication (part of the HTTP protocol) has 
been used. Basic Authentication effectively 
transmits passwords in plain text and is therefore 
breaches confidentiality best practice. 
 
OPEN-HTTP : Indicates HTTP is carrying plain 
text (or MIME encoded) payload. 
WEAK:  Indicates WEP encryption (ie, static keys) 
has been used. 
STRONG-IPSEC : Indicates Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) – the encryption protocol 
of IPSec (IP Security). The dominant protocol 
used within Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
 
STRONG-KERBEROS: Major authentication 
protocol – all credentials are strongly encrypted. 
 
STRONG-TLS/SSL: SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is 
the major security protocol – used heavily with 
HTTP. TLS (Transport Layer Security) is the IETF 
standardised version of SSL. 
 
STRONG-S/MIME: S/MIME (Secure MIME) is the 
dominant protocol for email security. S/MIME uses 
a specifically defined mime type (“pkcs7-mime”) to 
carry encrypted data. 
 
OPEN-MS-FILE-TRANSFER: Indicates the 
presence of a Microsoft File System transfer via 
Server Message Block (SMB) over NetBios and 
TCP.  
 
LOOP: For the next packet imaged by the Copy 
Engine do the following:  
 
? Step 1: Is the packet a data frame (ie, not a 
WLAN control or management frame).  
 NO - increment TOTAL by 1 and 
return to LOOP.   
 YES – is the protected bit set?  
o YES - increment WEAK-
WEP and TOTAL 
counts by 1. 
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Discard the 
packet and return 
to LOOP.  
continue too NO -  next 
? Step 2a: Does the packet contain an IP 
? show the 
? /UDP header show the 
88 (Kerberos authentication port) – 
 – 
 
? Step : D e port 
data 
 - increment STRONG-
 ment OPEN-
 80 TP) data 
 -
 TP and 
 11
 – increment STRONG-
 
step. 
header? NO, increment the TOTAL global 
count by 1. Discard the packet and return to 
LOOP (the audit is not interested in non-IP 
protocol packets – these cannot carry user 
data (eg, protocols such as ICMP, IGMP, 
ARP). YES – continue to next step. 
Step 2b: Does the IP header 
protocol field is set to IPSec encryption? That 
is, protocol field is set to 50 indicating 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)? YES, 
increment STRONG-IPSec and TOTAL by 1. 
Discard the packet and return to LOOP. NO – 
continue to next step. 
Step 3: Does the TCP
port field contains any one of the following 
values: 
 
increment STRONG-Kerberos and 
TOTAL by one – return to LOOP. 
443 (HTTP over TLS/SSL) 
increment STRONG-TLS/SSL and 
TOTAL by one – return to LOOP. 
NO – continue to next step. 
4 oes the TCP header show th
field contains any of the following values: 
 25 (SMTP email) – does the 
payload contain the string “pkcs7-
mime”? 
YES 
SMIME and TOTAL by one – 
return to LOOP. 
NO – incre
SENDING-EMAIL and TOTAL by 
one – return to LOOP. 
 (HTTP) – does the (HT
payload contain the string “Basic”? 
YES – increment OPEN-HTTP
AUTHENTICATION and TOTAL 
by one – return to LOOP. 
NO – increment OPEN-HT
TOTAL by one – return to LOOP. 
0 (POP email) – does the data 
payload contain the string “pkcs7-
mime”? 
YES 
SMIME by one – return to LOOP. 
NO – increment OPEN-
RECEIVING-EMAIL by one – 
return to LOOP. 
 139 (NetBios) – does the data 
payload contain the string “Session 
Message”? 
 YES – increment OPEN-MS-
FILE-TRANSFER and TOTAL – 
return to LOOP. 
 NO – (indicating a NetBios control 
message) – increment TOTAL 
and return to LOOP. 
END LOOP – all packets have been analysed – 
call the logger module to output results.  
 
The logger will output two audit reports that will be 
discussed in the next section.  
4. Research evaluation 
The overall evaluation of the software audit tool is 
made against two critical success factors: 
innovation and utility.  
4.1 Innovation 
The discussion of Section 3 presented innovation 
as a major criterion in classifying good design 
science research. (Hevner) outlined innovation as 
follows:  
“design-science research addresses 
important unsolved problems in unique and 
innovative ways or solved problems in more 
effective or efficient ways. The key 
differentiator between routine design and 
design research is the clear identification of 
a contribution to the archival knowledge 
base of foundations and methodologies”.  
The problem domain (confidentiality within 
WLANs) for this research is not new. 
Confidentiality is considered historically as a 
fundamental focus (with authentication and 
integrity) within IT security (Garfinkel 2002). 
Section 2 has also described the evolution over 
several years of WLAN confidentiality controls.  
The literature review conducted with this research, 
however, has verified that no existing 
confidentiality audit compliance controls for 
WLANs have been based on software-automated 
real time packet analysis. (The heavily used 
packet monitoring tools Ethereal and tcpdump are 
very much designed for network administrator 
manual analysis of packet characteristics). Indeed 
the increasing influential ISO/IEC 17799 (the 
Information Security policy control instrument) and 
ISO/IEC 27001 (the Information Security 
compliance certification instrument) still exhibit 
only very superficial coverage of WLAN security 
compliance. It is also noted that the real time 
packet analysis methodology of this research fits 
very well with IS security audit best practice as 
described in ISO/IEC 27001. That is, the audit 
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methodology within this research is non-intrusive 
to network productivity/bandwidth, resistant to 
attack, and active in identifying control 
weaknesses (as contrasted with a reactive audit 
strategy whereby the absence of attacks – not the 
absence of weaknesses – is reported).   
4.2 Utility 
The utility of this research will be discussed in 
terms of the results returned via the beta testing of 
the audit tool within a university WLAN 
environment. The results from the audit tool 
comprise two main reports: (1) a statistical 
overview of confidentiality levels (Table 2); and (2) 
a detailed report of those transmissions where 
non-secured user data has been detected (Table 
3). 
Table 2:  Statistical overview of WLAN confidentiality levels 
Confidentiality Level  
(1, 2, or 3) 
Total 
Packets 
Comments 
NetBios and 
SMB 
HTTP 
Authentication 
HTTP 
Plain  
SMTP 
Email 
POP/IMAP 
Email 
 
1 
 
Open system  
(no encryption) 
 
93897 
 792 1897 20125 187 897 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)  
2 
 
Weak Encryption 
 
8345 
8345 
IPSec 
(Layer 3) 
SSL/TLS 
(Layer 4) 
Kerberos 
(Layer 7) 
S/MIME 
(Layer 7) 
 
3 
 
Strong Encryption 
 
57945 
40328 13762 3610 245 
Total Sample Size 160187  
 
Table 2 shows the overall results of beta testing 
the audit tool over twenty-four sampling sessions 
(each session of 30 minutes). A total of 160187 
transmissions were sampled of which nearly 59% 
(93897) were open transmissions. Within the 
‘open’ category there were 792 network file 
system transfers, and a total of 1084 email 
transfers. Perhaps of most concern were the 1897 
passwords transferred unsecured via HTTP 
Authentication. The dominant form of strong 
encryption was via IPSec (most likely across a 
VPN).
Table 3: Detailed transmission report of non-secured user data 
Date  Time Vulnerability Type Client Address (IP:Port) Server Address 
(IP:Port) 
3 May 06 12.56pm HTTP Auth. 192.168.12.87:12389 192.168.2.3:80 
3 May 06 12.59pm SMTP 192.168.12.87:13567 192.168.2.4:25 
3 May 06 1.43pm SMTP 192.168.12.87:13568 192.168.2.4:25 
3 May 06 1.51pm POP 192.168.12.68:11324 192.168.2.5:110 
 
Table 3 shows a small sample of four entries from 
the detailed transmission report of non-secured 
data. The report identifies the vulnerability type 
and also the client/server addresses (both IP and 
port). This detailed transmission report provides 
(at least) one main security purpose. The report 
identifies the server that is involved in creating the 
vulnerability. For example, entry 1 in Table 3 
shows that a web server is still serving web pages 
under HTTP Authentication (ie, plain text 
exchange of passwords). This should not occur in 
a secure production environment – the preferred 
strategy is to always request authentication within 
an SSL session. It is also apparent that the 
detailed report provides very useful trend 
information. 
5. Best practice 
The previous sections of this paper have 
highlighted the chequered development of WLAN 
security. Whilst the most recent 802.11i/WPA2 
security specification is considered strong (Gast 
2005), it is also clear that the take-up of this 
specification requires the upgrading of network 
card hardware.  Additionally, 802.11i is a complex 
specification and its full adoption within any 
network requires a system administrator to focus 
upon design issues at several levels (i.e., the data 
link layer, network layer, transport layer, and the 
application layer). This complexity is clearly a 
significant challenge to administrators and 
network owners. Within this context of relatively 
slow transitional progress to full 802.11i / WPA2 
adoption, this section will now focus on best 
practice in the two main areas of WLAN 
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deployment: (1) public wireless hotspots and (2) 
corporate networks (offering WLANs). 
5.1 Public wireless hotspots 
WLAN technology was developed about the same 
time that the Internet was expanding rapidly. It is 
not surprising that the two technologies have 
become closely linked. A pubic wireless hotspot is 
any location (e.g. airport, hotel, coffee shop) 
where any person with 802.11 hardware capability 
can legitimately connect to an access point 
(possibly for a paid fee) and receive broader 
network/Internet connectivity. Whilst this may 
prove to be a rich service delivery model in the 
near future (in principle it means that 802.11 could 
compete with the existing cellular phone 
infrastructure), the service model adoption has 
proven to be problematic for two main reasons 
(Edney 2004): the fax machine problem (i.e. a 
lack of user ‘critical mass’) and also the multiparty 
barrier problem (i.e. multiple stake holders 
combining to deliver the service and each/every 
stakeholder requiring healthy financial returns). 
Notwithstanding the service model growth 
challenges, it is important to appreciate the 
organisation of public wireless hotspots – and the 
consequential security implications. The logical 
organisation of public wireless hotspots is shown 
in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: WLAN hot spot organisation 
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The subscribers and access point equipment 
shown in Figure 3 are standardised IEEE 802.11 
equipment. This means that the hot spot 
organisation is based very much upon a “no new 
hardware/software” paradigm – hot spot 
users/subscribers are most reluctant to use any 
hotspot service that requires specialised hardware 
installation or software downloads (Edney 2004). 
Typically the subscribers and access points do not 
use any data link layer encryption (i.e. no WEP or 
RSN/WPA2 security). The hotspot controller of 
Figure 3 is the critical infrastructure in the overall 
WLAN hotspot operation. Typically the hotspot 
controller will perform the following functions: 
 
? Coordinate user authentication 
? Collection of account and billing information 
? Collation of usage time and subscription time 
statistics 
? Provision of local IP addresses 
? Access to World Wide Web services 
? Access to Domain Name Services 
The authentication server of Figure 3 is typically 
accessed and facilitated via Web protocols. The 
most common approach to date is to require user 
login via a Web page. This approach requires the 
subscriber to connect/associate with an access 
point and start his/her Web browser. The first Web 
request initiated from the browser will be directed 
by the hotspot controller to the authentication 
server. The authentication server will complete the 
necessary login process – and from this point on 
(subject to certain subscription time settings) each 
user web request will then be routed to the 
appropriate destination service by the hotspot 
controller. The security implications for WLAN 
hotspot users centre very much upon the 
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confidentiality risks posed by open security (i.e. no 
data link layer encryption) IEEE 802.11 
deployment. The most direct confidentially risk is 
the passive viewing of private or commercially 
sensitive data during transmission across the 
(hotspot) WLAN – this has been evidenced within 
our audit tool beta testing described in Section 4 
of this paper. A second important risk shown up 
within our research is the active attack against the 
shared file system of a WLAN user. Many popular 
operating systems (including Windows XP) 
provide default share directories. The operating 
system will ‘advertise’ the shared directory via 
network broadcasts and this strategy provides a 
most popular method of sharing data for small 
businesses and home users. These network 
advertisements pose a serious security risk when 
a subscriber commences a WLAN hotspot 
session without firstly ‘unsharing’ the shared data 
repository. The WLAN hotspot security risks 
outlined above are best mitigated at the present 
time via personal firewalls and virtual private 
networks (VPNs) – and in the future via the 
deployment of IEEE 802.11i. A personal firewall 
operating on a subscriber’s computer can easily 
be configured to allow only TCP/IP packets to 
exit/enter the subscriber’s computer. This protocol 
suite is required for Internet/Web use – but does 
not routinely facilitate LAN based computer-to-
computer communication (which includes 
directory sharing). This should manage the risks 
posed via shared file systems. A VPN creates an 
encrypted tunnel through any network that is 
considered to be unsecured (i.e. the Internet).  A 
typical use for a VPN tunnel is to connect an 
employee to their company’s intranet. The VPN 
encrypts all TCP/IP communications whilst those 
communications are traversing the unsecured 
network(s). The VPN concept is most useful when 
a subscriber wishes to communicate with only one 
destination (e.g. the corporate network) – but is 
problematic if communication is required 
concurrently with several destination networks. 
The most comprehensive (but still a future 
focused) solution for hotspot WLANs will be the 
broad-based adoption of IEEE 802.11i. This 
solution will leverage built-in operating system 
support to allow the subscriber to choose the most 
suitable form of user-authentication and data link 
layer encryption – and thereby mitigate the 
confidentiality risks to within acceptable levels. 
5.2 Corporate networks WLAN 
deployment 
The best practice deployment of a WLAN within 
(onto) a corporate network requires two 
conceptual steps to ensure a professional level of 
protection: 
 
? Isolate (potentially) hostile traffic from all 
sensitive corporate traffic and canalise (i.e. 
force traffic down a well defined route) this 
traffic through a small set of well protected 
and comprehensively logged fixed entry 
points. 
? Deploy defence in depth via (1) the 
authentication of all traffic using an access 
point and (2) the strong encryption of all data 
transferred between each WLAN client and 
each access point. 
The ultimate implementation of the above points 
would also create a firewall within each WLAN 
access point. However this solution does not 
scale well – and may mean an unsupportable 
level of work within the context of a corporate 
network. A more scalable solution is now 
discussed with respect to Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 shows that the isolation of (potentially) 
hostile traffic is achieved via the use of corporate 
switches to create a Virtual Local Area Network 
(or VLAN) as per IEEE 802.10. The alternative to 
a VLAN is to run new LAN cables to all access 
points and create a single new LAN – however 
this solution is not optimal in terms of time and 
cost. Whilst the VLAN solution is still vulnerable to 
several attack vectors (including ARP spoofing), it 
is still clearly preferable to allowing traffic from 
access points to intermix with other corporate 
traffic. The canalisation of (potentially) hostile 
traffic is then achieved (as shown in Figure 4) via 
the deployment of a firewall at the point at which 
VLAN (and therefore WLAN) traffic enters the 
corporate wired LAN. The second conceptual step 
for strong security is the creation of defence in 
depth – comprising data link layer strong 
encryption (for confidentiality) and access control. 
The strong encryption is implemented via 
RSN/WPA2 security operating between each 
wireless access client and each access point. The 
access control is achieved using the IEEE (access 
control) 802.1X and suitably constructed X.509 
digital certificates operating across each wireless 
client, each access point, and a corporate Radius 
server. 
Conclusions 
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against attack, and active in its analysis and 
reporting of security vulnerabilities.  
The clear responsibility for WLAN administrators 
is to provide network users with best practice 
security strategies to mitigate the real risk of 
unauthorised data access. The clear responsibility 
for IT auditors is to ensure that best practice 
security strategies are in place and that 
operational compliance is consistently achieved. 
WLAN security is complicated by the open nature 
of the wireless signal propagation which in turn 
creates a confidentiality vulnerability. The 
development of WLAN protocols with robust 
confidentiality controls (ie, encryption) has been 
problematic. Indeed it is only very recently that a 
verifiably robust solution has been specified 
(802.11i) – and this solution will take time to roll 
out across WLAN services and users. Best 
practice security strategies for WLANs are 
routinely agreed within the IT industry (Garfinkel 
2002) to comprise strong data encryption of 
transmitted packets. In the general WLAN 
transmission case, this strong encryption may be 
provided by 802.11i (layer 2) or VPNs based on 
IPSec (layer 3). Higher level (ie, layer 4 and 
above) more specific encryption solutions centre 
upon SSL/TLS for HTTP, Kerberos for secure 
authentication, and S/MIME for secure email. It 
remains very unclear within the IT industry, 
however, as to how the level of WLAN operational 
compliance with these best practice methods may 
be gauged and reported. This research has 
developed a software audit tool to analyse the 
level of confidentiality within a production WLAN 
system. The audit tool is innovative, non-intrusive 
on network productivity/bandwidth, controlled 
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